Abstract. The paper is concerned with a continuum model of the limit order book, viewed as a noncooperative game for n players. An external buyer asks for a random amount X > 0 of a given asset. This amount will be bought at the lowest available price, as long as the price does not exceed a given upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of the asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori.
1. Introduction. This paper is concerned with a continuum model of the limit order book in a stock market, viewed as a noncooperative game for n players. Our main goal is to study the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, determining the optimal bidding strategies of the various agents who submit limit orders.
We consider a one-sided limit order book. In our basic setting, we assume that an external buyer asks for a random amount of X > 0 of shares of a certain asset. This external agent will buy the amount X at the lowest available price, as long as this price does not exceed a given upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of this asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori.
Having observed the prices asked by his competitors, each seller must determine an optimal strategy, maximizing his expected payoff. Of course, when other sellers are present, asking a higher price for a stock reduces the probability of selling it.
In our model we assume that the i-th player owns an amount κ i of stock. He can put all of it on sale at a given price, or offer different portions at different prices. In general, his strategy will thus be described by a measure µ i on IR + , where µ i ([0, p]) denotes the total amount of shares put on sale by the i-th player at a price ≤ p.
In practice, it is clear that prices can take only a discrete set of values. However, by studying a continuum model where strategies are described by Radon measures one obtains clear-cut results on existence or non-existence of Nash equilibria, and clean, explicit solution formulas. In general, it turns out that the Nash equilibrium consists of measures which are absolutely continuous w.r.t. Lebesgue measure.
Several recent papers ( [9] , [12] , [5] ) deal with the modeling of the limit order book from the point of view of the agents who submit the limit orders. These models are intrinsically discrete in the price variable: limit orders can be submitted at prices {p 1 , . . . , p N } and to each price there corresponds a queue of limit orders, which are to be executed according to a first-in-first-out schedule. The shape of the limit order book is determined by the prices at which the various agents decide to submit their limit orders.
On the other hand, in [?] , [8] , [10] , [1] the prices are continuous and the shape of the limit order book is described by a density. An important achievement of these models is that, when the shape of the limit order book is given, this determines a corresponding price impact function. The price impact function describes how the execution of a market order affects the underlying asset prices, i.e. it describes how the bid and ask prices change after the execution of a market order. Clearly, this is a quantity of key importance in the modeling of financial markets and an understanding of the price impact function allows us to gain insight in the mechanism of price formation. In [8] the limit order book has a block shape and this gives rise to a linear price impact. In [10] and [1] the limit order book density has a general shape which is described by a measure. These papers, given the order book shape as input, mainly consider the problem of optimal execution of trades by means of market orders.
In our model, prices are allowed to vary in a continuum of values but the shape of the limit order book is not given a priori. Indeed, we prove that this shape can be endogenously determined as the unique Nash equilibrium, resulting from the optimal pricing strategies implemented by the selling agents.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we consider the optimization problem for a single agent, who observes the limit orders submitted by his competitors and wishes to optimally price the sale of his own assets. We also introduce a fundamental distinction between two classes of random variables: Type A and Type B. These two types yield completely different results when Nash equilibria are studied.
Under general assumptions, the existence of an optimal pricing strategy is proved in Section 3. Necessary conditions for optimality are derived in Sections 4 and 5. For random variables of Type B, these imply that the optimal strategy always consists in putting all the assets for sale at the same price. In Section 6 we prove some sufficient conditions for optimality.
Sections 7 and 8 are devoted to the study of Nash equilibria. We consider n players, putting on sale quantities κ 1 , . . . , κ n of the same asset. We say that an ntuple of pricing strategies (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) provides a Nash equilibrium if each µ i provides an optimal strategy for the i-th agent, in reply to the bidding strategies of all the other agents. When the random buying order X is a random variable of type A, we prove that this noncooperative game admits a unique Nash equilibrium, which is explicitly determined. On the other hand, if the random variable X is of type B, we show that no Nash equilibrium can exist.
In Section 9 we consider an asymptotic limit, where the total number of sellers approaches infinity, while the amount of asset put on sale by each agent approaches zero. In this case, the limit order book approaches a well defined shape, determined by the probability distribution of the random variable X. From this model, one can deduce the price impact of an incoming buying order of size X. Some explicit examples are provided in Section 10.
In addition to the classical paper [7] , for an introduction to non-cooperative games and Nash equilibria we refer to [3, 6, 13, 14] .
2. The optimization problem for a single player. A general optimization problem for one agent can be formulated as follows. Let X be a non-negative random variable, with distribution function
Throughout the following we shall assume (A1) The map s → ψ(s) is continuously differentiable and satisfies
We shall consider two main classes of random variables, depending on the decay properties of the function ψ.
Definition 1. We say that a probability distribution is
For example, the probability distributions determined by ψ 1 (s) = e −λs , λ > 0 , ψ 2 (s) = 1 (1+s) α , α > 0 , are of type A, while ψ 3 (s) = e −s 2 yields a probability distribution of type B. Roughly speaking, a probability distribution is of type A if its tail decays not faster than a negative exponential. Of course, one can consider more general probability distributions, where (ln ψ) changes sign. For such random variables, the analysis will likely be more difficult.
Let Φ 0 : [0, P ] → IR + be a non-negative, nondecreasing function. For every p, we think of Φ 0 (p) as the total amount of stock offered for sale at a price ≤ p by the other agents. Consider an additional seller entering the market, owning an amount κ of stock.
Definition 2.
A pricing strategy for the new player is a nondecreasing map
Using the Lagrangian variable β ∈ [0, κ] to label a particular share in possession of the new agent, by φ(β) we thus denote the price at which this particular share is put on sale. The total amount of shares that the new agent offers for sale at price ≤ p is thus computed by
This is the push-forward of the Lebesgue measure on [0, κ] w.r.t. the map φ. Next, assume that the incoming order has size X. The total amount of stock sold by the new agent is 5) yielding the payoff
Here p 0 > 0 is the value that the new player attaches to a unit amount of stock. For example, it could be the mean bid-ask price.
The optimization problem for the new seller can thus be formulated as
denotes the expectation w.r.t. the probability distribution of the random variable X.
Observe that, by (2.1) and (2.9), we have the equivalent representation
Remark 1. If Φ 0 has a jump at a point ξ, this means that a positive amount of stock is offered for sale by the other agents at the price ξ. Two main cases can arise. CASE 1: Φ 0 is left continuous, i.e. Φ 0 (ξ) = Φ 0 (ξ−). This means that the new agent has selling priority. If he also puts on sale a positive amount of stock at the same price ξ, his stock will be the first to be sold. CASE 2: Φ 0 is right continuous, i.e. Φ 0 (ξ) = Φ 0 (ξ+). This means that the new agent does not have selling priority. If he also puts on sale a positive amount of stock at the same price ξ, his stock will be the last to be sold.
Notice that in Case 1 the function Φ 0 is lower semicontinuous. This property will play a key role in the proof of existence of an optimal strategy.
3. Existence of an optimal strategy. Our first result shows the existence of an optimal strategy for the new agent, assuming that he has selling priority. Proof. Let (φ ν ) ν≥1 be a maximizing sequence of pricing strategies. Since all functions φ ν are non-decreasing, using Helly's compactness theorem (see for example [11] , p. 372), by extracting a subsequence and relabeling we can achieve the pointwise convergence
We claim that the strategy φ * is optimal. Indeed, since Φ 0 is lower semicontinuous and ψ is strictly decreasing, the composite map s → ψ(Φ 0 (s)) is upper semicontinuous and for every β ∈ [0, κ] we have lim sup
In turn, this yields
Example 1. If the new player does not have priority, an optimal strategy may fail to exist. For example, assume that the other sellers offer a total amount of stock κ 0 , all at the same price P . This situation is described by the right continuous function
Assume that the new player has an amount κ of stock to put on sale. For each ν ≥ 1, consider the pricing strategy φ ν (β) ≡ P − ν −1 . Then (φ ν ) ν≥1 is a maximizing sequence. Writing a ∧ b . = min{a, b}, a + . = max{a, 0}, the expected payoffs are
However, the expected payoff (P − p 0 ) · E[X ∧ κ] could be achieved only if the new agent puts all his stock for sale at the maximum price P and has selling priority over the other agents (that would correspond to Φ 0 being left continuous). However, if Φ 0 is the function in (3.2), the new agent does not have priority. With the strategy φ * (β) ≡ P he only achieves
4. Necessary conditions. In this section we seek necessary conditions for the optimality of a pricing strategy φ for the new agent. For this purpose given a nonnegative, nondecreasing function Φ 0 : [0, P ] → IR + as in (2.9), we introduce the functions
For 0 ≤ a < b ≤ κ we shall also consider the integrated function
Remark 2. If the random variable X is of type A, then for every p the map β → G β (p) is non-decreasing. On the other hand, if X is of type B, then the maps β → G β (p) are strictly decreasing. In this section we do not make any assumption on the left or right continuity of Φ 0 . It will thus be convenient to define the left continuous function
In other words, Φ 0 is the unique left continuous function that coincides with Φ 0 everywhere with the possible exception of countably many points of jump. Call J (φ) the expected payoff achieved by a pricing strategy φ : [0, κ] → [0, P ] when Φ 0 is replaced by Φ 0 . Lemma 4.1. In the above setting, for every Φ 0 : [0, P ] → IR + and κ > 0 one has
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, the maximum expected payoff on the right hand side of (4.4) is attained. Namely, there exists a pricing strategy φ * such that
Consider the strategies φ n (β) = φ * (β) − 1 n . The corresponding payoffs satisfy
The converse inequality is clear.
Given a nondecreasing map φ :
such that φ is constant on each S j and strictly increasing elsewhere. Namely, defining
one has
In connection with the measure µ 1 introduced at (2.8), we observe that the atomic part of µ 1 is the measure µ (
(4.5) Proof. 1. Assume that the second inequality in (4.9) does not hold at some
Hence the nondecreasing function Φ 0 is right continuous at the point x 0 = φ(β 0 ). By continuity we can thus find λ and δ > 0 such that
(4.6)
2. We claim that there exists ε ∈ ]0, δ] such that the following conditions hold.
Indeed, by definition of liminf there exists ε 2 ∈ ]0, δ] such that
Consider the modified function
By lower semicontinuity, the function η → Φ 0 (x 0 + η) − λη attains a strictly negative minimum on the interval [0,
is a point where this minimum is attained, then (4.15) holds. 3. Let φ ε+ be the perturbed strategy defined by
Since ψ < 0, using (4.15) and then (4.13), one obtains
for some positive constant δ 0 . Using Lemma 4.1 we conclude
reaching a contradiction. The first inequality in (4.9) can be proved by an entirely similar argument. 4. The two statements (4.10)-(4.11) will be deduced as consequences of the more general necessary conditions
(4.8)
Indeed, the two inequalities in (4.10) are obtained by observing that
Moreover, (4.11) follows from the two inequalities in (4.22), choosing ξ = b i and ξ = a i , respectively. 5. It now remains to prove (4.22) . Assume that the first inequality in (4.22) fails at β 0 ∈ [a i , b i ], and call x 0 = φ(β 0 ). Then by continuity we can find λ and δ > 0 such that lim inf
which implies that there exists c 0 > 0 such that
Choose ε ∈ ]0, δ] such that the following conditions hold.
where δ(ε) ↓ 0, as ε → 0. Let φ ξ,ε+ be the perturbed strategy defined by
One obtains
) λ dp dβ
for ε > 0 sufficiently small. Notice that the last inequality follows from (4.23) and (4.24). Using Lemma 4.1 we reach a contradiction. Corollary 4.3. Assume that Φ 0 (·) is piecewise C 1 , and let φ(·) be an optimal strategy. Then for almost every β ∈ [0, κ] \ S one has d dp
Hence (4.28) follows from (4.9).
Example 2. Assume that the random variable X has exponential distribution, so that
is an optimal pricing strategy, then the necessary conditions imply that the range of φ should by contained in the set
5. Atomic optimal strategies. Our next goal is to prove that, if the random variable X is of type B, then any optimal pricing strategy for the new agent must be constant. Namely, all stock should be offered for sale at the same price. A preliminary lemma will be needed.
Lemma 5.1. Let X be a random variable of type B. Assume that φ : [0, κ] → [0, P ] is a pricing strategy taking exactly two values, say p 1 and p 2 . Then one of the two constant strategies φ 1 (β) ≡ p 1 or φ 2 (β) ≡ p 2 yields an expected payoff strictly larger than φ.
Proof.
The corresponding payoff is
We claim that the maximum of J(φ θ ) can be attained only if θ = 0 or θ = κ. 2. Assume, on the contrary, that
The optimality conditions yield
In turn, these imply
We now recall that X is of type B, hence ψ ψ < 0. Therefore
From (5.5) we obtain
The inequality (5.7) is thus in contradiction with (5.6). This achieves the proof. The same argument used in the proof of Lemma 5.1 yields
be a pricing strategy taking finitely many values p 1 < p 2 < . . . < p m . For a given k ∈ {1, . . . , m − 1}, consider the two strategies
In other words, we can always replace a strategy taking m distinct values with a new strategy taking m − 1 values and achieving at least the same payoff.
Remark 3. Consider the continuous function
Let κ 0 . = Φ 0 (P ). The proof of Lemma 5.1 shows that F > 0 on the set
Given any ε > 0, consider the compact subset
Since F is strictly positive on the compact set Ω ε , it attains a strictly positive minimum δ(ε) > 0 on Ω ε . In particular, this shows that given a positive ε, we can find δ(ε) > 0 such that the following holds. Assume that 0 ≤ p 1 ≤ p 2 − ε < p 2 ≤ P and θ ∈ [ε, κ − ε]. Then the pricing strategy φ θ in (5.1) satisfies
Theorem 5.3. Assume that the random variable X is of type B and satisfies the assumption (A1). Then, given any nondecreasing map Φ 0 , any optimal solution φ of the problem (2.10) must be constant.
Proof. Let φ be an optimal solution. Assuming that φ is not constant, we shall derive a contradiction.
1. Choose ε > 0 and points 0 < a < a + 2ε < b < P so that
Let δ(ε) > 0 be the corresponding constant in (5.9), and choose an integer n large enough so that κ n < min {ε , δ(ε)} .
Introduce the points p j . = j/n and consider the approximate, piecewise constant strategy
This definition yields
2. By construction, φ n takes only finitely many values p 0 , . . . , p N . Since the random variable X is of type B, by repeatedly using Corollary 5.2 we can replace the strategy φ n with a strategy φ taking only three distinct values, P 1 , P 2 , P 3 . More precisely, we can find three prices P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ∈ {p 1 , . . . , p N }, with
such that the following holds. Defining the piecewise constant strategy
one has J(φ ) ≥ J(φ n ) .
3.
If now P 2 − P 1 ≤ P 3 − P 2 , we apply once again Corollary 5.2 and obtain a strategy φ of the form
with
On the other hand, if now P 2 −P 1 > P 3 −P 2 , we use Corollary 5.2 to obtain a strategy φ of the form
In both cases we obtain a strategy φ taking exactly two values Q 1 , Q 2 , with
4. Finally, consider the two constant strategies
By (5.16) and (5.9), we conclude
This contradicts the optimality of φ, proving the theorem.
6. Sufficient conditions. We now consider a case where all strategies φ : [0, β] → [p 0 , P ] which satisfy the necessary conditions stated in Theorem 4.2 are in fact optimal. We make the following assumption on the regularity of Φ 0 .
(A2) The map s → Φ 0 (s) is continuous on the half-open interval [0, P [ . Moreover, its derivative Φ 0 (p) is piecewise continuous. Theorem 6.1 (sufficient conditions). Let the assumptions (A1)-(A2) hold, and let X be a random variable of type A, so that (2.3) holds. Moreover, assume that one has
Then φ is optimal.
Proof. Assuming that the new agent has priority, by Theorem 3.1 an optimal strategy φ * exists. Let now φ be any admissible strategy which satisfies the conditions (6.1). Consider the interpolated strategy
Since φ * is optimal, to prove that φ is also optimal it thus suffices to show that
We have
and (6.3) follows from the fact that ψ (s) < 0 for every s, and
Hence the integrand is nonnegative for every β.
Example 3. Assume that X is exponentially distributed, as in (4.29), and that there exists a subinterval [ 
does not depend on β. The result follows directly from Theorem 6.1 and Example 2.
7. Nash Equilibria. We now assume that n traders compete, selling different amounts of the same asset. For i = 1, . . . , n, let κ i be the amount of stock put on sale by the i-th agent and let φ i : [0, κ i ] → IR + be his pricing strategy. We wish to study Nash non-cooperative equilibria, where the strategy of each player is an optimal reply to the strategies adopted by all the other players. In the following, we assume that all traders have the same payoff function, and they all assign the same probability distribution to the random size X of the incoming order. 
Then the n-tuple of strategies (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) is a Nash equilibrium solution to the bidding game if each φ * i provides an optimal pricing strategy for the problem Maximize:
Remark 4. The above definition does not mention the possible priority of one seller over another. Indeed, priority is irrelevant, because in any Nash equilibrium it is not possible that two sellers offer positive amounts of asset at the same price p * . If this happens, the agent that does not have priority could offer his amount at price p * − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small, and achieve a strictly larger expected payoff. This motivates our choice (7.1) of right-continuous functions Φ i .
If the random variable X is of type A, in this section we shall prove that a Nash equilibrium solution always exists, and explicitly determine the strategies of the various players. On the other hand, if X is of type B, we prove that no Nash equilibrium solution can exist.
As a preliminary example, given a random variable X of type A we construct the Nash equilibrium in the special case when all players have the exact same amount of shares to offer for sale.
Lemma 7.1 (Nash equilibrium for identical players). Assume that X is of type A and satisfies the assumptions (A1). Consider n players, each one putting on sale the same amount κ = κ 1 = · · · = κ n of asset. Then the pricing strategies
3)
4)
provide a Nash equilibrium solution to the bidding game (7.2).
Proof. 1. Since ψ < 0, the pricing strategies in (7.3)-(7.4) are strictly increasing. Moreover, for i = 1, . . . , n, the functions Φ 1 = · · · = Φ n = Φ in (7.1) are all equal and satisfy
By (7.4)-(7.5), a direct computation shows that
The ask price p A is the minimum price at which some of the asset is offered for sale.
2.
In order to check the necessary condition (4.28), we compute
. By (7.5) and (7.7), this yields
showing that (4.28) holds.
3.
To prove that the n-tuple of pricing strategies in (7.3)-(7.4) provides a Nash equilibrium, we need to show that each strategy satisfies the sufficient conditions for optimality (6.1).
Fix any value β * ∈ [0, κ] and call p * . = φ(β * ).
Consider any two prices p 1 , p 2 ∈ [p 0 , P ], with p 1 < p * < p 2 . As observed in Remark 2, since the random variable X is of type A, the map β → G β (p) is nondecreasing. Hence
where β 2 > β * is such that p 2 = φ(β 2 ).
Next, if p 1 > φ(0), there exists β 1 < β * such that φ(β 1 ) = p 1 and
On the other hand, if p 1 ≤ φ(0), then Φ 0 (p 1 ) = 0 and clearly
The three inequalities (7.10), (7.11), (7.12) show that the sufficient conditions (6.1) are satisfied, and therefore (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) provides a Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5. In this Nash equilibrium the expected payoff of each agent is
We now extend the previous result to an arbitrary number of players, putting on sale different amounts of the asset. Theorem 7.2 (existence of a Nash equilibrium). Let X be a random variable of type A, satisfying the assumptions (A1). Given n ≥ 2 players, putting on sale the amounts κ 1 , . . . , κ n > 0 of the same asset, the bidding game (7.2) has a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. 1. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
We claim that a Nash equilibrium solution is provided by the following pricing strate-gies:
. . .
Starting from the explicit formulas (7.15), a direct computation shows that the corresponding functions Φ i in (7.1) satisfy
Moreover, for every j = 1, . . . , n one has (see Fig. 7 .1)
To determine all functions Φ j , it thus suffices to compute Φ n . This is a continuous, nondecreasing, piecewise C 1 function on [0, P [ , which satisfies
(7.13) By (7.17) it follows
(7.14)
In particular, by (7.18)-(7.19) it follows that the necessary conditions Φ i (φ i (β)) = G β (i(φ i (β)), stated in Corollary 4.3, are satisfied. 3. In order to apply the sufficient condition for optimality stated in Theorem 6.1, given any p * = φ i (β * ), we need to check that
where G β i (p) is defined as in (4.1), with Φ 0 replaced by Φ i :
We observe that, since the random variable X is of type A, from (7.16) it follows
As in the proof of Lemma 7.1, we shall consider various cases. CASE 1: p < p 1 . In this case Φ i (p) = 0 and the inequality G
CASE 2: p 1 < p < p * . We can then find β ∈ [0, β * ] such that φ i (β) = p. Since the random variable X is of type A, by Remark 2 this implies
Theorem 7.3 (nonexistence of a Nash equilibrium). Let X be a random variable of type B, satisfying the assumptions (A1). Then, for any number n ≥ 2 of players offering amounts κ 1 , . . . , κ n > 0 of the same asset for sale, a Nash equilibrium cannot exist (regardless of the selling priorities established among the players).
Proof. 1. Assume, on the contrary, that a Nash equilibrium (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) exists. By Theorem 5.3, each pricing strategy φ * i must be constant, say
We claim that
Otherwise, since one of the two players does not have the priority over the other, he could increase his expected payoff by pricing all his asset at p i − ε, for some ε small enough.
. . , n} such that p k < P . Then the k-th player can unilaterally increase his payoff by using the strategỹ
This contradiction shows that no Nash equilibrium can exist.
8. Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. In this section we prove that, if the random variable X is of type A, then the Nash equilibrium constructed in Theorem 7.2 is unique.
In the following, given an n-tuple of pricing strategies φ : [0, κ i ] → [0, P ], we denote by
the amount of asset put on sale at price ≤ p by the i-th player. Moreover, we define
Observe that, with these definitions, the functions Φ i in (7.1) are expressed by
Lemma 8.1. Let the n-tuple (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) be a Nash equilibrium. Then the following holds.
(i) There exists a Lipschitz constant C such that
(ii) At most one of the functions F i can have an upward jump at p = P , while all the others are Lipschitz continuous on the entire interval [0, P ]. (iii) There exists a minimum ask price p A and a constant δ 0 > 0 such that
Proof. 1. Let
We claim that for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set
is empty. Indeed, if S i = ∅, we can write S i as a union of intervals, say
Consider any other player, say the j-th player, with j = i. Then
Otherwise, the j-th player could get a strictly higher expected payoff by using the strategyφ
as the following computation shows:
The first inequality follows from (8.6) and the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, the third inequality follows from the fact that X is of Type A, and the strict inequality follows from the definition (8.5). However, if (8.7) holds for every j = i, then the strategy φ i for the i-th player is not optimal. Indeed, he could achieve a strictly higher payoff by setting
for some ε > 0 sufficiently small. This proves that Φ j is Lipschitz on the interval [p * , P ] for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since
we conclude that F is Lipschitz continuous on [p * , P [. Let p be a point such that F (p) > 0. Then at least one agent is putting some shares on sale at the price p. From the necessary conditions (4.28) on the best reply of any of the n players, if F > 0, then it satisfies the inequality
Denote by Y (p) the solution to the terminal value problem
By direct computation we see that
which implies that Y (p * ) = 0. By comparison, we see that Y (p) ≥ F (p) and therefore
This proves the first assertion of the Lemma.
2.
The second assertion is clear: if two players put a positive amount of asset for sale at the same price P , the one that does not have priority can improve his expected payoff by selling the asset at price P − ε.
3. Toward a proof of (iii), we show that there exists δ 0 > 0 small enough so that, for any p * < P , the following implication holds:
Indeed, let
and observe that δ 0 > 0. By (i) it follows that F is differentiable at a.e. point p ∈ [0, P ]. Assume F (p * ) ≤ δ 0 and consider the non-empty set
If F (p) = F (p * ) for all p ∈ S * , recalling that F is Lipschitz continuous we conclude that F (p) = F (p * ) = 0 for all p ≤ p * , as claimed. In the opposite case, there exist p < p * such that
Clearly, at least one the the players is putting some assets for sale within the price interval [p , p * ], say, the i-th player. This leads to a contradiction, because by (8.9)
Hence the strategyφ
otherwise , yields a strictly higher expected payoff: 
Recalling (4.1), from the necessary conditions (4.9) we deduce
Observing that
The Lipschitz function F thus satisfies the ODE
3. We claim that, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the set of prices where the i-th player offers assets for sale is an interval [p A , p i+1 ]. Assume, on the contrary, that this is not the case. To derive a contradiction, call
Then, for any δ 1 > 0, the following two sets are non-empty:
Indeed, B is nonempty, by the definition of infimum. Moreover, if q * = q then q * ∈ A = ∅, otherwise A is nonempty by the definition of infimum. From the necessary conditions (4.28) we deduce
for p ∈ S i . Choose the intermediate slope
By continuity we can choose δ 0 < δ 1 small enough so that
Finally, let p 1 ∈ A and p 2 ∈ B be Lebesgue points of F i and consider the two lines
We split the analysis into two cases.
We then consider the intermediate point
Then the new pricing strategỹ
otherwise, yields a strictly better expected payoff:
  dp dβ > 0.
CASE 2: γ 1 < γ 2 . We then consider the intermediate point
An entirely similar argument now shows that the new pricing strategỹ
otherwise, yields a strictly better expected payoff. In both cases we showed that φ i is not optimal, thus reaching a contradiction.
4.
From the previous step it follows
We claim that p n = p n+1 = P . Indeed, if p n < p n+1 , this means that the n-th player is the only seller in the interval [p n , p n+1 ]. He could achieve a better expected payoff by taking all his assets originally on sale at a price p ∈ [p n , p n+1 ] and offering them at the price p n+1 instead. This shows that p n = p n+1 . Finally we show that p n = P . Indeed, if this were not the case, we would have
contradicting the third statement in Lemma 8.1.
9
. A large number of small agents. In this section we study the limiting case where the number of sellers approaches infinity, but the total amount of asset offered for sale remains bounded.
Example 3. Consider the simple case of n players, each one selling the same amount K/n of asset. By (7.7) in the proof of Lemma 7.1, the total amount Z n (p) = n n−1 Φ(p) of asset put on sale at price ≤ p is found by solving the ODE
As n → ∞, the limit distribution Z(p) = lim n→∞ Z n (p) is clearly obtained by solving
We wish to show that the same limit holds, without assuming that all players put on sale exactly the same amount of asset. Consider a sequence of bidding games, satisfying:
(G1) The n-th game involves n distinct players, selling the amounts κ n,1 , . . . , κ n,n of the same asset. (G2) The total amount of asset put on sale in the n-th game is
The largest amount of asset put on sale by any player in the n-th game approaches zero: lim n→∞ sup 1≤i≤n κ n,i = 0. The next result shows that, with the above assumptions, as n → ∞ the limit order book approaches a well defined shape. In the following, we call Z n (p) the amount of asset offered for sale at price < p, in the Nash equilibrium solution (7.15) for the n-th game. Moreover, we let Z(p) to be the solution to the Cauchy problem (9.1).
2.
For any fixed m ≥ 1, we claim that
Indeed, by (9.9) it follows that all maps Z n (·) are increasing and uniformly Lipschitz continuous, say
for some Lipschitz constant C. Since Z n (P ) = K n − h n → K as n → ∞, we can find δ > 0 such that
and all n sufficiently large. By (9.8) one has P pn,n−m Z n (p) dp ≤ (m + 1)
Together, (9.13) and (9.14) imply (9.11). Indeed, using (9.10), (9.13) and the assumption (A1), it follows that, if p n,n−m < P − δ, then P pn,n−m Z n (p) dp ≥ P pn,n−m
By (9.14) we thus have p n,n−m ≥ P − δ for all n sufficiently large. Therefore
showing that p n,n−m → P as n → ∞. In turn, this implies
≤ C(P − p n,n−m ) + |K − K n | + κ n,n → 0.
3. By the previous step, the function Z n satisfies the differential inequalities
, p n,1 < p < p n,n−m , (9.14) with terminal conditions at p = p n,n−m satisfying (9.11). We now compare (9.15) and (9.11) with (9.1). By standard results on the continuous dependence of solutions to a Cauchy problem, for any ε > 0 we have the convergence
uniformly on the interval [p A + ε, P − ε]. By (9.9), on the region where Z n > 0 the derivative satisfies Z n (p) ≥ c 0 for some constant c 0 > 0 and all p > 0, n ≥ 2. Since in (9.16) we can choose ε > 0 arbitrarily small, we conclude that the value p n in (9.6) satisfy and that all functions Z, Z n are uniformly Lipschitz continuous, from (9.16) and (9.17) we deduce the convergence (9.4)-(9.5).
Examples.
In this section we consider in more detail some particular cases, when the probability distribution of size of incoming market order is given.
Example 4. Assume that the size of the incoming market order is exponentially distributed, with mean λ −1 . Two competing agents put on sale the amounts κ 1 < κ 2 of shares. The Nash equilibrium (7.15) is given by
The cumulative limit order book is thus given by
This corresponds to a limit order book density
where δ P denotes a unit Dirac mass located at p = P , and the ask price p A is given by
The expected payoffs of the two agents in the Nash equilibrium configuration are given by
(1 − e −λ(κ2+2κ1) )(P − p 0 ) λ .
We observe that an increase in the total amount put on sale by the smaller player (hence by both players) lowers the ask price, and also decreases the expected payoff of both competitors. On the other hand, the larger player can increase his expected payoff by increasing the total amount of shares he puts on sale:
J 2 e −λκ1 (P − p 0 ) λ , as κ 2 → ∞, κ 1 fixed.
Finally, using the explicit expression of the limit order book resulting from the Nash equilibrium, we can also derive an expression for the price impact function ρ(X), which represents the increase in the ask price in response to a market order of size X. Indeed, ρ(X) is defined by the following implicit equation
This yields ρ(X) = (e λX 2 − 1)(P − p 0 )e
if X ≤ 2κ 1 , P − p A if X > 2κ 1 .
Example 5. Consider the asymptotic limit of a large number of small agents, putting on sale a total amount of K shares. Assume that the size of the incoming market order is exponentially distributed with mean λ −1 . In this case, the Cauchy problem (9.1) simplifies to
The expected payoff per unit amount of asset put on sale by any agent is given by
The ask price is p A = p 0 + (P − p 0 ) · e −λK , while the price impact function is given by Example 6. Assume that the random size X of the incoming buying order is distributed according to the power law distribution ψ(s) = (1 + s) −α . Consider n players, each one putting on sale the same amount κ of shares, for a total amount of K = nκ. The Nash equilibrium is thus given by (7.4): 
